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Abstract
Shaffer (1991) shows that a multiproduct monopolist selling differentiated products through a
unique retailer cannot earn monopoly profit using brand specific two−part tariffs and that
full−line forcing restores monopoly power. We extend this analysis to more general contracts
and shows that full−line forcing is efficient as it increases both industry profits and
consumers' surplus.
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The economic literature has provided many possible motivations for tying or full-line
forcing, such as price discrimination, cost optimization or leverage theory. The price
discrimination argument is generally applied to complementary products and states that
full-line forcing allows a multi-product monopolist to increase the surplus extracted from
homogeneous (Burstein, 1960a, b) or heterogeneous consumers (Bowman, 1957). On the
other side, the cost-savings motive emphasizes substitutable goods and shows that the
monopolist has incentives to tie-in the sales of substitutable inputs in order to induce
production cost minimization (Slade, 1997). Finally, the last justiﬁcation relates to the
widely contested leverage theory.1 The intuition is that the multi-product monopolist
may use tying to extend his monopoly power and eliminate competition in the tied-good
market. The common point of these models is that they all assume a direct relationship
between producers and ﬁnal consumers.
Shaﬀer (1991) provides a ﬁrst attempt to analyse full-line forcing in a vertical rela-
tionship. An upstream monopolist selling diﬀerentiated products (imperfect substitutes)
through a unique retailer cannot earn the monopoly proﬁtw i t hb r a n ds p e c i ﬁct w o - p a r t
tariﬀs. The retailer indeed earns a strictly positive rent attributable to the retailer’s dis-
cretion over brand choice. Shaﬀer also shows that full-line forcing (as well as other vertical
restraints like resale price maintenance and aggregate rebates) is a possible tool to avoid
retailer’s rent and restore monopoly proﬁt.
However, Shaﬀer does not consider the welfare eﬀects of such restraints. The objective
of this note is twofold. Considering a similar framework, we show that brand speciﬁct w o -
part tariﬀs lead to retail prices above the monopoly level. Full-line forcing is therefore a
useful tool for the producer allowing him to restore his monopoly proﬁt ,b u ti ta l s ol o w e r s
retail prices thereby increasing consumers’ surplus. The second purpose of our analysis is
to show that two-part tariﬀs are not optimal, and that the producer would prefer to use
non-linear tariﬀsa n dm o r es p e c i ﬁcally direct mechanisms. However, these contracts are
not suﬃcient to fully restore the monopoly proﬁt sa n da l s ol e a dt or e t a i lp r i c e sa b o v et h e
monopoly level.
2T h e F r a m e w o r k
A multi-product monopolist produces two imperfectly susbtitutable goods, A and B, un-
der constant returns to scale. This producer is unable to reach directly the ﬁnal consumers
and needs to sell his products through a unique retailer. The retailer operates under con-
stant returns to scale. In order to simplify the analysis, we normalize, without loss of
generality, all these constant marginal costs to 0. The timing is the following:
1. The producer makes one or several take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the retailer.
2. The retailer accepts or rejects each oﬀer and determines the quantities sold on the
ﬁnal market.
1For a comprehensive survey of the leverage theory and related criticisms, see Whinston (1990).
1The two products A and B are seen by the consumers as imperfect substitutes. For
sake of simplicity, we assume that the inverse demand functions are symmetric and given
by P (qA,q B)=PA (qA,q B)=PB (qB,q A)=1− qA − αqB, where 0 < α < 1.
• Benchmark: Joint Proﬁt Maximizing Outcome
Let us consider the joint proﬁt maximizing, or monopoly, situation as a benchmark.
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In this case, the retail prices on both markets are pM = 1
2. The monopoly proﬁta n dt h e











3 Brand Speciﬁc Two-Part Tariﬀs
Let us suppose in this section that the producer oﬀers two diﬀe r e n tt w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀs, one
for each product, (wA,F A) and (wB,F B). In this case, the analysis is identical to Shaﬀer
(1991). Denote by h π(wA,w B) and e π (wA), the retail proﬁts earned by the distributor
when he decides to sell respectively both products and product A only, that is:
h π(wA,w B)= m a x
(qA,qB)
[(P (qA,q B) − wA)qA +( P (qB,q A) − wB)qB] (1)
e π(wA)=m a x
qA
[(P (qA,0) − wA)qA]
Shaﬀer’s analysis shows that the producer has to leave a strictly positive rent to the
retailer to give him incentives to resell both products. The maximal franchise for a given
product is therefore equal to the additional surplus created by the presence of this product
in the retailer’s shelves, that is:
FA = h π (wA,w B) − e π (wB) and FB = h π(wA,w B) − e π(wA)
The producer’s maximization program is then
max
(wA,wB)
(wAh qA(wA,w B)+wBh qB (wB,w A)+FA + FB)
where h qA(wA,w B) and h qB (wA,w B) are the quantities at which (1) is maximized.
2This inverse demand functions are derived from the quasi-linear utility function

















2Proposition 1 Brand speciﬁc two-part tariﬀs lead to a consumers’ surplus lower than in
the monopoly situation, CSTPT <C S M.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition of this result is the following: the producer faces a trade-oﬀ between
maximizing the industry proﬁt thereby choosing wholesale prices such that the retailer
decides to resell the monopoly quantities, or limiting the rent left to the retailer. In this
linear model, the rent is a decreasing function of the wholesale prices, and the rent eﬀect
dominates the joint proﬁte ﬀect as long as p<p TPT. The producer therefore chooses
wholesale prices leading to retail prices above the monopoly level to limit the retailer’s
rent.
When the products are close substitutes (α >
√
2−1), the rent eﬀect is so important
that the producer prefers to resell only one good to avoid paying any rent to the retailer.
However, this still leads to lower proﬁt and consumers’ surplus than in the monopoly case.
As shown by Shaﬀer, full-line forcing (using a global aﬃne tariﬀ (wA,w B,F)3) allows
the manufacturer to eliminate the retailer’s rent and to restore monopoly proﬁt. The
retailer is indeed unable to select the products as he has only the choice between selling
both or none of them. Full-line forcing not only increases the producer’s proﬁt, it also
reduces the retail prices and thereby increases the consumers’ surplus.
4O p t i m a l B r a n d S p e c i ﬁcT a r i ﬀs
The objective of this section is to extend Shaﬀer’s analysis to more general wholesale
contracts. In most models of vertical restraints, two-part tariﬀsa r eo p t i m a la st h e ys o l v e
the double marginalisation problem and are therefore suﬃcient to maximize the joint proﬁt
and to allow the upstream monopolist to extract the entire proﬁt through the franchise
fee. In the present case, brand speciﬁc two-part tariﬀsa r en o ts u ﬃcient, and we want to
see whether more general brand speciﬁct a r i ﬀs could do better. We now assume that the
producer oﬀers two tariﬀs TA(qA) and TB(qB).4
Suppose that the distributor chooses to carry both products. He thus determines the
quantities h qA and h qB sold the ﬁnal consumers in order to maximize his retail proﬁt
πD(qA,q B)=P (qA,q B)qA + P (qB,q A)qB − TA(qA) − TB(qB)
If he chooses to sell only product A, he earns max
qA
[P (qA,0)qA − TA(qA)].
Thus, if the manufacturer want to sell positive quantities of his two products, he has








3Notice than in our case, since the marginal cost have been normalised to 0, this tariﬀ consists in 0
wholesale prices and in a franchise fee equal to πM.
4As we have already seen earlier in this paper, full-line forcing (i.e. a unique aﬃne tariﬀ T(qA,q B)=
πM), would allow the producer to recover the monopoly proﬁt.
3subject to the constraint :




[P (qA,0)qA − TA(qA)],max
qB
[P (qB,0)qB − TB(qB)]

(2)
The manufacturer has to ensure that the retailer is willing to accept both contracts. To
do this, he has to take into account that, when the retailer has already accepted a ﬁrst
contract and paid the corresponding franchise fee, the second product reduces the proﬁt
the retailer can make on the ﬁrst product. This creates the strategic rent earned by the
retailer. The retailer’s bargaining power arises from the opportunity cost of stocking an
additional brand. Since products are imperfect substitutes, the total sales of the two
p r o d u c t sa r el e s st h a nt h es u mo ft h es a l e so fe a c hp r o d u c tc a r r i e da l o n e .
The objective is now to derive the equilibrium quantities and to compare them to
the monopoly outcome. The following lemma shows that it is not necessary to consider
any possible tariﬀ, but that we can focus on direct mechanisms, TA =( qA,t A) and TB =
(qB,t B).
Lemma 2 The optimal quantities and proﬁts can always be implemented with direct mech-
anisms.
Proof. See Appendix B.
















=a r g m a x
((qA,tA),(qB,tB))
[tA − cAqA + tB − cBqB]
subject to the constraint :
P (qA,q B)qA + P (qB,q A)qB − tA − tB A max[0,P(qA,0)qA − tA,P(qB,0)qB − tB]
Proposition 3 With brand speciﬁc direct mechanisms:





, the producer prefers to sell only one






. This situation is then identical to brand speciﬁc
two-part tariﬀs.





, then the equilibrium is symmet-
ric. Both products are actually sold at a common retail price, pDM = 1+3α
2(1+2α), strictly
lower than with brand speciﬁct w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀs, but still higher than the monopoly
price, i.e. pM <p DM <p TPT. In this case, direct mechanisms do strictly better than
two-part tariﬀs, πM < πDM
P < πTPT
P .





4Proof. See Appendix C.
With two-part tariﬀs, the producer sets the wholesale prices in order to monitor the
quantities (or the retail prices) and the franchise fees to recover the proﬁta n ds a t i s f y
the retailer’s participation constraints. In this case, the retailer never chooses the same
quantities when he decides to resell both products than when he sells only one of them,
as he can adjust the quantities depending on the products actually sold.
Direct mechanisms are on the contrary similar to quantity forcing. The retailer cannot
modify the quantities and therefore the participation constraints are more easily satisﬁed.
In this sense, quantity forcing reduces the opportunity cost and thereby the rent the
producer has to leave. However, it does not eliminate this rent, and brand speciﬁcm e c h -
anisms, though they do at least as well than two-part tariﬀs, are not suﬃcient to fully
restore monopoly proﬁts.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The objective of this note was twofold. On one hand, we showed that brand speciﬁc
two-part tariﬀs are not the optimal choice for a multi-product monopolist dealing with
a unique retailer, even when he cannot tie-in the sales of the two products. We showed
indeed that, when the two products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, brand speciﬁc non linear
contracts in the form of direct mechanisms (or quantity forcing) do strictly better than
two-part tariﬀs. The key intuition is that quantity forcing reduces the retailer’s bargaining
power that arises from the possibility the retailer has to select the brands present in his
shelves. However, Shaﬀer’s intuition that this increased bargaining power leads to a loss
in proﬁt for the multi-product producer remains valid, and full-line forcing is a possible
way to solve this problem restoring the monopoly proﬁt.
The second objective was to extend Shaﬀer’s analysis to the comparison of retail
prices and consumers’ surplus. In both cases, brand speciﬁc two-part tariﬀs or direct
mechanisms, the producer reduces the rent left to the retailer by decreasing the quantities
sold to the ﬁnal consumers. Full-line forcing has therefore a positive impact on consumers
as it leads to higher quantities (or lower retail prices), though it restores the monopoly
prices and proﬁt. Full-line forcing is thereby beneﬁcial for the industry as a whole and
for the consumers as it reduces price distortions.
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6A Proof of Proposition 1
In our linear framework we have
∂h π
∂wA
=1− wA − 2qA − 2αqB and
∂h π
∂wB
=1− wB − 2qB − 2αqA
and this leads to quantities
h qA (wA,w B)=
1 − α − wA + αwB
2(1 − α2)
= h qB (wB,w A)
and to the retail proﬁt
h π(wA,w B)=




When the retailer decides to carry only product A, his retail proﬁti s
e π(wA)=m a x
qA




T h ep r o d u c e ro b j e c t i v ei st h u s :
max
(wA,wB)
πP = wAh qA (wA,w B)+wBh qB (wB,w A)+2h π (wA,w B) − e π(wA) − e π(wB)
=













By symmetry, we have wB = α
1+α, and this easily leads to the quantities qA = qB = 1
2(1+α)2
and the retail prices pA = pB = 1+2α
2(1+α). The producer’s proﬁti st h u se q u a lt o 1
2(1+α)2 < πM
and the consumers’ surplus is CS = 1
4(1+α)3 <CS M.
The other possibility for the producer, is to avoid any retailer’s rent and to sell only one
of the two products. In this case, the producer oﬀers a two-part tariﬀ with a wholesale
price equal to the marginal cost (w =0 , in order to maximize the joint proﬁt). The
quantity actually sold is thus q = 1
2 and the retail price is p = 1
2. The producer is now
able to recover the whole proﬁt as the retailer’s outside option is 0. This proﬁti s1
4 and
the consumer’s surplus 1
8 <C S M.
In order to decide whether to sell both products (and leave a rent to the retailer) or
only one of them, the producer’s compares to two proﬁts
πP(A + B) > πP(A) ⇔
1






7B Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that T∗
A(.) and T ∗
B(.) are the optimal contracts, such that the retailer chooses the
quantities q∗
A and q∗










[P (qB,0)qB − TB(qB)]

and we necessarily have
max
qA
[P (qA,0)qA − T
∗











[P (qB,0)qB − T
∗















B ≤ P (q∗
A,0)q∗
A + P (q∗
B,0)q∗
B, the retailer proﬁti sn e c -
essarily positive and the manufacturer can never obtain a proﬁt higher than
Π



































he satisﬁes the participation constraint and achieve a proﬁte q u a lt oΠ∗. This shows that
direct mechanisms are optimal in this framework.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Since (P (qA,q B) − P (qA,0))qA+(P (qB,q A) − P (qB,0))qB < 0, the manufacturer’s pro-




































































=a r gm a x
(qA,qB)
πD(qA,q B), where
πD(qA,q B)=( 2 P (qA,q B) − P (qA,0))qA +( 2 P (qB,q A) − P (qB,0))qB





The ﬁrst-order conditions are therefore
∂πD
∂qA
=1− 2qA − 4αqB and
∂πD
∂qB
=1− 2qB − 4αqA
• For α < 1
2 :
8In this case, the objective function is strictly concave and the ﬁrst-order conditions
are therefore necessary and suﬃcient. The solution is symmetric and given by qA =
qB = qDM = 1
2(1+2α), and this easily leads to a retail price pDM = 1+3α
2(1+2α). It is then
straightforward to check that pM <p DM <p TPT and πM < πDM
P < πTPT
P . As the price
pDM is higher than the monopoly price, the consumers’ surplus is strictly lower than in
the monopoly situation, CSDM <CS M.
• For α ≥ 1
2 :
In this case, the program is not concave and we have a corner solution. The producer
prefers to avoid any retailer’s rent and decides to sell only one product. He sells a quantity
qDM = 1
2 (the retail price being pDM = pM for the product actually sold) with a ﬁxed
transfer tDM = 1
4 < πM. This situation is identical to the two-part tariﬀs case. Therefore,
proﬁt and consumers’ surplus are lower than in the monopoly situation.
9